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From the point of view of moral justification, the most important
thing about any property right is what it prohibits people from doing: if
you own Blackacre, then I may not encroach on that land without your
permission. This applies to intellectual property as much as to property
in material resources. If you have made a fortune out of popularizing the
cheerful scrubbed faces of Mickey and Minnie Mouse, I may not depict
them in my underground comic books as "active members of a free
thinking, promiscuous, drug-ingesting counterculture." 1 Intellectual
property like all other property places limits on what individuals are al-
lowed to do.
Our tendency of course is to focus on authors when we think about
intellectual property. Many of us are authors ourselves: reading a case
about copyright we can empathize readily with a plaintiff's feeling for
the effort he has put in, his need to control his work, and his natural
desire to reap the fruits of his own labor. In this Essay, however, I shall
look at the way we think about actual, potential and putative infringers
of copyright, those whose freedom is or might be constrained by others'
ownership of songs, plays, words, images and stories. Clearly our con-
cept of the author and this concept of the copier are two sides of the same
coin. If we think of an author as having a natural right to profit from his
work, then we will think of the copier as some sort of thief; whereas if we
think of the author as beneficiary of a statutory monopoly, it may be
easier to see the copier as an embodiment of free enterprise values. These
are the connections I want to discuss, and my argument will be that we
cannot begin to unravel the conundrums of moral justification in this
area unless we are willing to approach the matter even-handedly from
both sides of the question.
II. HOHFELDIAN ANALYSIS
First some analytical comments about property rights and duties.2
To justify private property is to justify conferring, recognizing and en-
forcing certain individual rights. An individual has rights of ownership
in relation to some resource 0 if he has (RI) the right to use 0, (R2) the
right to exclude others from the use of 0, and (R3) the power to transfer
1. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1132 (1979). A quote from Kevin W. Wheelright, Comment, Parody, Copyrights and the First
Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 564, 582 (1976).
2. Much of the material in Part I is adapted from my article Property, Justification and Need,
forthcoming in the CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
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these rights to others by way of gift, sale or bequest. 3 Of these elements,
the second, R2, is the most important for our purposes. It is the addition
of this element of exclusion that transforms the right to use into an essen-
tiallyprivate right. In itself, RI is roughly what we all have in relation to
public parks and sidewalks. It is only when we conjoin to it R 2 that we
get something like a person's right to use his own land. Moreover it is
only because someone has R2 that R3 is necessary. If the land in question
were common, if others could use it without anyone's consent, there
would be nothing for the owner to transfer to them.
Jeremy Bentham and Wesley N. Hohfeld have taught us the value of
analyzing rights in terms of the correlative propositions about duty that
they entail.4 R 1-the right to use-is what Hohfeld would call a privi-
lege. It is correlative to a negative proposition about duty: (RI) P has the
right to use 0 entails (DI) P has no duty not to use 0. Thus, in the first
instance, RI is correlative to a proposition (a negative proposition) about
the duties of the right-bearer. True, RI may also be supported by a more
robust claim-right: (Rt *) P has the right not to be prevented from using 0.
That additional right is correlative to a proposition not about P's duties,
but about the duties of other people: (D1*) Others have a duty not to
prevent P from using 0.5 And behind that may stand further proposi-
tions about P's right to set proceedings in motion to vindicate and en-
force his right not to be prevented from using 0, and officials' duties to
respond to those proceedings. Still, so far, all this could be said of P's
right to use some public park.
What distinguishes P's right as one of private ownership is the addi-
tion of R 2, the element of exclusion that I mentioned. This also can be
analyzed in terms of its relation to propositions about duty. (R2) P has
the right to exclude others from 0 entails (D2) Others have a duty not to
use or occupy 0 without P's permission. Unlike R, R2 is correlative to a
proposition about the duties of persons other than the right-bearer. And,
of course, just as RI is supported by RI* etc., so R2 is supported by R2*: P
has the right to set in motion certain proceedings to have others removed
from or prevented from using 0 if they do not have his permission, and
3. Of course, as we have already noted, private property is really much more complicated than
this; but this will do for the purposes of the present discussion. For fuller accounts, see Anthony M.
Honori, Ownership, in Oxford Essays In Jurisprudence (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) and JEREMY WAL-
DRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 26-61 (1988).
4. See WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923) and H.L.A.
HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY (1982).
5. See H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 171,
179-83 (Alfred W.B. Simpson ed., 1973) (on "liberty-rights and their protective perimeter"). This
distinction between a bare privilege and a privilege conjoined with a claim-right will be important
later, in Part VIII. See infra note 90, and accompanying text.
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officials have a duty to respond to these proceedings (and if necessary to
drag the miscreants away).
D2 is what our attention should be arrested by when we attempt to
justify private ownership. It is always tempting to take the perspective of
the right-bearer, and show what a marvelous thing it is for him to have
all these rights. They protect and promote his personality. They vindi-
cate his right to the labor of his body. They reward his desert. They
allow him to make plans, and to exercise his autonomy. The virtue of the
Hohfeldian analysis is that it compels us to concentrate on the other side
of the coin: the correlative duty. To think that R2 is a good sort of right
to recognize in our society is to think that D2 is a good sort of duty to
impose.
Analysis takes us this far; but the point of focusing on duties is more
than merely analytic. Since legal duties are hard things for people to
have-since they constrain conduct and in that sense limit freedom-we
should expect the realm of duties to be the testing ground for claims of
right. The realm of duties-the propositions about duty that a given
claim of right entails-is where we should expect the problems with the
right (if there are any) to surface. It is true that not all the problems of a
legal institution are connected with the duties it imposes. But the duties
are a good place to start, since they will take us to whatever hardships
are most intimately involved in the immediate recognition and enforce-
ment of the rights.
III. THE PERSPECTIVE OF INDIVIDUALS
Focusing on the correlativity between R2 and D2 has one other
merit. It poses the issue of the justification of property rights strictly in
individualistic terms: we match an individual right with an individual
constraint. That may not sound remarkable; surely the justification of
private property is always individualistic. But it is surprising how rarely
the individualist case is pitted against individualist objections.
Let me begin with the debate about property in material objects.
Philosophical discussions of material property commonly approach the
matter from two perspectives. They approach it from the individual per-
spective of the rights and interests of the would-be proprietor, and they
approach it, secondly, from the perspective of society as a whole.
The first perspective focuses on the person whose interest in owning
something is taken to be morally significant. This is the Lockean farmer,
the deserving entrepreneur, or the subject of Hegelian Bildung: the per-
son who has mixed his labor with a piece of land, who has extended the
[Vol. 68:841
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realm of his self-ownership, who has taken a risk, deserves a reward,
requires an external domain for the exercise of his free will, or craves a
basis for independence against the encroachments of the community and
the state.
To the extent that these individualist assertions are ever opposed or
evaluated critically, the claims that are cited against them are usually
those of society. Property, it is said, is not an absolute individual right,
but one that must serve a social function. As Alan Ryan puts it, there is
"a consensus that 'It's his' invites the further question, 'What good does
its being his do for everyone else?' -6 So we develop arguments from a
second perspective, that of the general welfare. The hard cases for pri-
vate property are almost always phrased in these social terms: social irre-
sponsibility, patterns of inequality, pollution, poverty, crime, and so on.
7
Thus, from the first (individualist) perspective, the argument is all in
favor of private property. It is only when one gets to the second (social)
perspective, that the arguments against get a hearing.
The trouble with locating all the objections at the second or social
level is the trouble with any aggregative approach to utility or the general
good: the particularity of the individual's predicament disappears from
view. By emphasizing social problems, we lose sight of the intensity or
significance of individual costs. Now this individualist worry about so-
cial values is, of course, most often cited by the owners whose interests
are the subject of the Lockean justifications (the arguments put forward
from the first perspective). They are the ones who complain vociferously
about the threat to individual freedom from a preoccupation with social
function. Theirs, however, are not the only individual interests at stake.
When we evaluate private property in land, for example, we should
surely consider, in the first instance, those individuals whose activities
are most directly constrained by the rules. In a sense, of course, we are
all constrained: you mustn't encroach on my land and I mustn't en-
croach on yours. But the individuals whose position is most deeply
prejudiced are those who do not own or have any rights over privately
owned land at all-the homeless. They bear all of the restraints, and
6. ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLrICAL THEORY 177 (1986).
7. LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977) is a good
example. The one chapter he devotes to "Anti-Property Arguments" (Chapter 8) divides the objec-
tions to private property into four general types: "arguments to the effect that property rights have
an overall social disutility; arguments to the effect that the institution of property rights is self-
defeating; arguments to the effect that private ownership produces vicious character traits... ; and
arguments to the effect that systems of property rights produce and perpetuate unjustifiable socio-
economic inequality." Id. at 88.
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they enjoy none of the benefits, that accrue from the rights distributed in
a private property regime.
Of course their interests will be counted, along with everyone else's,
in any decent calculus of social advantage. But we know enough about
politics to be able to say that theirs are the interests most likely to be
neglected in the real world. Thus if social values are taken to be the only
basis for critical evaluation of property claims, we may be in danger of
leaving out of the picture the predicament of those most directly,
grievously and immediately affected by the enforcement of property
rules-those to whom, above all, a justification of property is owed.
Another way of putting the point is that when private property
rights are viewed critically, they are most commonly viewed as obstacles
to the carrying out of public policy.8 For example, property development
by a landowner may be viewed obstructing the conservation of a coast-
line or the historic character of a neighborhood. If the claims of the poor
are cited at all, they tend to come in derivatively, as the distant benefi-
ciaries of public schemes that are being frustrated by property rights.
But in reality property rights impact non-derivatively on the poor, un-
mediated by our public policy schemes. They bear the direct brunt of the
institution, for they are immediately excluded by the rules from taking
and using the resources they need to live. It is wrong, then, to relegate
their interests to a secondary position, behind the claims made aggrega-
tively in the name of public policy.
The point becomes even more acute when we turn from social policy
critiques to social policy defenses of private property rights. Suppose it
can be shown that the institution benefits "society as a whole", by mak-
ing markets possible and thereby promoting progress and prosperity.
Then the minority of individuals-the poor and the homeless-who are
prejudiced by private property run the risk of being overlooked alto-
gether if their interests and objections have traditionally been assembled
under the heading of "social concerns." Now that it has been established
as a general principle that social functionality is the issue and that indi-
vidual economic interests may not be asserted against social values,
where are these few impoverished persons to turn to vindicate their
"anti-social" claims?
8. In other words, we make the mistake of viewing all rights-property rights included-
through Dworkin's model, the model of constitutional rights, rights against the government, rights
as trumps over social policy or utility. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
It is as though property rights were identified purely with the takings clauses of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, whereas in fact all those clauses do is add a constitutional immunity to a set of rights that
already exist and have consequences. See WALDRON, supra note 3, at 17-19.
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IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INDIVIDUAL CONSTRAINTS AND
SOCIAL RiGHTs
Being constrained by rules of intellectual property is a different mat-
ter from being constrained by material property rules. The homeless per-
son may freeze or starve because he finds himself excluded from every
sheltered place and prohibited from taking literally any piece of food.
No one is going to die as a result of a prohibition on copying someone
else's song or software. I shall return to this difference between material
and intellectual deprivation later in the Essay. 9 But there are two other
important distinctions between the way we think about intellectual prop-
erty and the way I have said we tend to think about material property.
The first distinction is that it is much more natural in the case of
intellectual property to identify individual rights as the basis of any ob-
jection. By contrast, objections to material property tend, as we saw in
Part III, to be articulated in the name of social interests. Though in both
cases (material and intellectual) it is easy enough to conjure up an image
of the constrained individual as a sort of thief-a would-be burglar or a
would-be plagiarist-in the case of intellectual property there's a sense
that something more may be said on behalf of the would-be copier, or the
would-be user or consumer of intellectual products. We may see him, for
example, as the bearer of First Amendment rights, 10 or as a dissident
citizen trying to have his say in public or cultural life, but effectively
silenced by someone else's assertion of proprietary rights.II The image of
minorities or underdogs being silenced by corporate power pervades in-
tellectual property law. One can conjure up affecting pictures of the or-
ganizers of the Gay Olympics in San Francisco being enjoined from using
the word "Olympic" by the corporation running the official Los Angeles
Games, 12 or the comic book satirists of Air Pirates being silenced by the
Walt Disney empire. 13 There are perspectives therefore from which to
criticize intellectual property that are plainly individualist in character.
Even when First Amendment values are not at stake, there is still a
9. See infra part VII.
10. See, e-g., Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180 (1970) and L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copy-
right, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. ReV. 1 (1987).
11. I don't mean to argue here for the existence of a First Amendment based privilege analo-
gous to, but distinct from, the privilege of fair use. Such an argument is hopeless now in view of the
majority opinion in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985). I
mean only to suggest that in the debate about the moral justification of intellectual property, values
associated with free speech are often still referred to.
12. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522
(1987).
13. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
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disturbing sense that ordinary people are being taxed and restricted by
monopoly rights in cultural enjoyment and in the exercise of their imagi-
nations. Lord Macaulay's observation on copyright is usually taken as
the high-water mark of this opposition: "The principle of copyright is
this. It is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers.
The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on one of the most innocent
and most salutary of human pleasures .... ,14 The contrast here with
material property is striking. One occasionally hears private property
condemned as theft, 15 but except among the followers of Henry.George it
is rare to hear it condemned as a form of taxation. 16 Somehow the mo-
nopoly characteristics of intellectual property make this form of individ-
ualist objection much more natural.
A second difference between material and intellectual property is
that, in our legal culture, the defense of intellectual property is seldom
cast in purely individualistic terms. Officially, the justification is sup-
posed to have more to do with the social good than with the individual
natural rights of authors. The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to. their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries." 17 The clause emphasizes that copy-
right is purely a matter of positive law; it is to be a creature of statute, in
contrast to the rights which are recognized in the Bill of Rights. More-
over the clause insists that the positive law of intellectual property is
subservient to a specific policy goal: it is a means to an end, as the 1961
Report of the Register of Copyrights put it.18 The point is not merely
that the individual rights of authors must be balanced against the social
good. 19 The Constitution stipulates that authors' rights are created to
serve the social good, so any balancing must be done within the overall
context of the public good, i.e. between the specific aspect of the public
good that is served by intellectual property ("the Progress of Science and
14. Macaulay, Copyright (Speech in the House of Commons, 1841), in 8 WORKS 195, 201
(Trevelyan ed., 1879).
15. See P.J. PROUDHON, WHAT Is PROPERTY? AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT
AND OF GOVERNMENT 12 (Benjamin R. Tucker trans., 1970): "Property is robberyl... What a
revolution in human ideas!"
16. See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (1942) (arguing that the private appropria-
tion of land is pure rent-seeking behavior).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (Comm.
Print 1961).
19. Cf SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL., COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (1992): "It is
for Congress to define the balance between the rights of copyright owners and the needs of the
public."
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useful Arts") and other aspects of the public good such as the progressive
effects of the free circulation of ideas. Though many philosophers, utili-
tarians especially, urge something along these lines about all types of
property,20 there is no equivalent to it as a constitutional and doctrinal
starting point in the case of the ownership of land or other material
resources.
These distinguishing characteristics of our thought about intellec-
tual property are by no means unambiguous or uncontested. On the one
hand, although the official line about copyright is that it is a matter of
social policy, judicial and scholarly rhetoric on the subject retains many
of the characteristics of natural rights talk. On the other hand, although
the person constrained by copyright is sometimes seen as the vindicator
of free speech values, those values themselves-when they crop up in
copyright doctrine-tend to get stated in social rather than individual
terms. In the Parts that follow, I shall explore each of these tendencies in
the philosophy of intellectual property in some detail. I shall consider the
conversion of social defenses of intellectual property into individual de-
fenses in Part V, and the reverse move, the conversion of individualist
opposition into social policy considerations, in Part VI.
Even at this stage, however, it is worth noting how these two ten-
dencies interact. To the extent that copyright and other intellectual
rights are treated as private property, the limitation on free speech can be
defended as an instance of the general principle that the First Amend-
ment does not entitle one to abuse another's property.21 Conversely, to
the extent that free speech values are presented as considerations of so-
cial utility, it is open to defenders of intellectual property to show that
those values are served, not disserved, by the free flow of ideas that copy-
right incentives elicit.22
20. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
21. For the general principle that the owner of real property may exclude an unwelcome
speaker from his land, see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). But cf. Pruneyard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that shopping malls may have a quasi-public aspect to
them for the purpose of this doctrine). For application of the general principle to intellectual prop-
erty, see Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 775 F.2d 247, 249 (8th Cir. 1985). There is a good
discussion in Robert J. Shaugnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment
Analysis, 72 VA. L. REv. 1079, 1111-12 (1986).
22. See, eg., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184,
1187 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[flree expression is enriched by protecting the creations of authors from
exploitation by others .... ") This dictum is endorsed by David E. Shipley, Conflicts Between
Copyright and the First Amendment After Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 1986 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 983, 1042.
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V. FROM SOCIAL INCENTIVES TO INDIVIDUAL DESERT
I have said that we find it easier to view copyright as a matter of
positive law and social policy than to view material property in this light.
The Constitution makes it clear that intellectual property rights are lim-
ited rights subordinated to a social purpose, and the point is reinforced in
both judicial doctrine and legislative history. The Supreme Court in-
sisted in 1948 that intellectual property law "makes reward to the owner
a secondary consideration. ' 23 The point was echoed by the House Com-
mittee reporting on the 1909 Copyright Act:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author
has in his writings .... but upon the ground that the welfare of the
public will be served... by securing to authors for limited periods the
exclusive rights to their writings. 24
Despite this emphasis, however, there is a understandable tendency
to develop robust doctrines of individual moral entitlement even within
the social policy framework. This is due in part to the fact that natural
rights ideas have never really been lost sight of in intellectual property
law despite the social policy emphasis I have referred to. Natural rights
formed part of the dialectical background to the emergence of modem
copyright in eighteenth century England,25 they are heard in an under-
tone throughout the American case law,26 and they figure prominently in
recent scholarship on the subject.27 There is a sense that natural rights
and social utility considerations need not be opposed and may well con-
verge in the case of intellectual property-a view given some authority at
the framing of the Constitution by James Madison.28 Part of it, too, is
23. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). See also Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ('The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.").
24. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
25. Compare Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burrows 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769) and Donaldson v.
Becket, 4 Burrows 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774).
26. Beginning with Justice Thompson's dissent in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 669-
70 (1834): 'The great principle on which the author's right rests, is, that it is the fruit or production
of his own labour, and which may, by the labour of the faculties of the mind, establish a right of
property, as well as by the faculties of the body ......
27. For Lockean themes of natural right in modern intellectual property scholarship, see Justin
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) and recent articles by
Wendy J. Gordon such as An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency,
Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989) [hereinafter An Inquiry], On
Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149
(1992), and A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE LJ. 1533 (1993) [hereinafter A Property Right in Self Expression).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law. The right to useful
[Vol. 68:841
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due to the natural tendency to reify rights even when they are set up and
justified purely on utilitarian grounds. It seems psychologically unavoid-
able that rights grounded in utility will be taken as ends in themselves:
too much emphasis on the utilitarian character of the premises can un-
dermine people's sense that it is a right (as opposed, say, to some defeasi-
ble presumption or rule of thumb) that is grounded in this way.29
But the tendency I want to discuss in this Part is not a matter of
pressure on the social policy framework from extraneous natural rights
ideas. It is a tendency internal to the particular social policy framework
that is deployed in defense of copyright.
The reasoning goes like this. The overall social good is served by
the progress of science and useful arts. The progress of science and use-
ful arts is served by the encouragement of authors. The encouragement
of authors is secured by providing them with the incentive of legally se-
cured monopoly profits from the sale and circulation of their works over
a limited period of time. Incentives work by conferring benefits on those
whose activity we are trying to encourage. Such a benefit may be seen as
a reward for their efforts. Rewards are what we characteristically pro-
vide for moral desert; we reward the deserving and penalize the unde-
serving. Therefore, authors deserve the intellectual property rights that
are secured to them in the name of social policy. The thought moves
from encouragement to incentive to benefit to reward to desert, so that
something which starts off as a matter of desirable social policy ends up
entrenched in an image of moral entitlement.
The logical fallacy (affirming the consequent) occurs in the last step
of the argument. From the innocuous premise:
(1) If someone is morally deserving, then it is appropriate to reward
him;
inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in
both cases with the claims of individuals."). For a general thesis of convergence between utilitarian
and natural rights considerations, see Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural
Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 713 (1989).
29. There has been considerable discussion of this in the philosophical literature, beginning
with DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, § ii, 497-98 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1951)
(1888)
But however single acts of justice may be contrary to public or private interest, 'tis certain,
that the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive, or indeed absolutely requisite, both to
the support of society, and the well-being of every individual. 'Tis impossible to separate
the good from the ill.
See also R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELs, METHOD AND PONT 44-64, 147-68 (1981);
David Lyons, Utility and Rights, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 110 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984); BER-
NARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LMrrs OF PHILOSOPHY 107-10 (1985); Christopher T. Won-




(2) If it is appropriate to reward someone, then that person must be
morally deserving.
And from (2) together with:
(3) It is appropriate to reward authors;
we can infer:
(4) Authors are morally deserving.
Now someone may object that the move from (1) to (2) is not fallacious
inasmuch as the very term "reward" connotes the idea of moral desert.
But just try substituting for "reward" one of the earlier terms in the se-
ries-"benefit" or "incentive"-and the fallacy is once again transparent.
We can see this with a case that provides a counter-example to the
scheme of inference I have just set out. The overall social good is served
by senators- keeping in touch with their constituents. But keeping in
touch with constituents involves travelling back and forth to one's home
state, and that can be dreary and exhausting as well as expensive. Even if
senators were given free air travel, they might not do it often enough. So
let's suppose we provide them with freefirst class travel as an incentive:
they can now enjoy themselves with free drinks as they fly back and forth
between Washington D.C. and North Dakota or wherever. This incen-
tive-the benefit of free first-class travel-might be seen as a necessary
reward to the senators for keeping in touch with their constituents. But
would we therefore infer that they morally deserve first class travel?
Clearly not. Offering the benefit is simply a matter of behavioral manipu-
lation of a class of individuals who have shown that they can be relied on
to promote the public interest only when it is made coincident with their
own.
That an argument is fallacious shows nothing about its judicial or
rhetorical utility.30 Two aspects of the incentive idea seem to strike
judges as particularly salient in developing an undercurrent of moral de-
sert in copyright law. One is the aspect of talent. Copyright is not
workfare; these are not just bums or senators who are being provided
with incentives to do something socially desirable. They are talented in-
dividuals, ,and what we are attempting to elicit from them are the works
of their creative genius. A meritocratic society already associates the
idea of desert with talented excellence and, as Lawrence Becker shows in
his contribution to this Symposium, there is a natural enough link be-
tween talent, admiration, and the sense that the artist we applaud ought
30. See infra note 116.
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to benefit from his achievement.31
Fortunately, this position is overshadowed somewhat in practice by
the courts' sense that, for the purposes of the Constitution's reference to
originality, a very modest spark of creativity will do. As Justice Holmes
put it in a 1903 case concerning circus posters, "[ilt would be a danger-
ous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute them-
selves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations. '32 But again, the
life of the law is not logic, and the fact that there is no test of talent or
genius does not prevent the resonance of those ideas from influencing the
rhetoric which sustains intellectual property doctrine as a whole.
The other aspect is that of cost. Works of authorship do not appear
by magic. Our romantic fancy is that authors sweat blood to produce
them, usually in conditions of ignominy and penury, starving in a garret
somewhere. Thus the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein,33 having given a
perfectly good account of the social welfare rationale for copyright, went
on to sum it up in language worthy of the Last Judgment: "Sacrificial
days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate
with the services rendered. ' 34 True, the Court has now scotched the idea
that being the product of hard labor in and of itself qualifies an intellec-
tual product (such as a telephone book) as an original work deserving of
copyright protection. The test, Justice O'Connor has insisted, is original-
ity, not "sweat of the brow."' 35 Nevertheless Justice O'Connor's own ju-
risprudence suggests that the costliness to the author of his creative
efforts remains a necessary, even if it is not a sufficient, condition for
according copyright protection. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enterprises, she insisted that "[t]he rights conferred by copyright are
designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for
their labors."'36
The same attitude is sometimes taken towards publishers' costs as
well. As Zechariah Chafee notes, one reason for allowing publishers to
hold copyrights is that this is an indirect way of benefiting authors. But a
second reason, he says, is "that it is only equitable that the publisher
should obtain a return on his investment. '37 The view is an odd one.
31. See Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHi.-KENT L. REv.
609 (1993).
32. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
33. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
34. Id. at 219.
35. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1295 (1991) (rejecting
Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (1922)).
36. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).




Where else do we say it is a matter of equity that investors should make a
profit? Usually our view is that investors venture out into any market at
their own risk. If a given market happens to be structured in such a way
as to yield poor returns, that may be a matter of utilitarian or economic
concern, but it is hardly a matter for intervention on grounds of fairness
to cover investors' costs.
It is certainly true that the economic theory of copyright underlying
the social policy rationale makes returns to costs the central issue. The
idea is that since the creation of a new work is costly to the author 38 in
time, effort and money, it will be undertaken only when it promises bene-
fits to him greater than the costs he can expect to incur. Now presuma-
bly, the author receives some satisfaction directly from his own product,
either from the contemplation of his achievement, from fame, or from
the immediate utility of what he has created, if it happens to be useful to
him.3 9 Absent any profits from the sale of the work, authors will not
produce new works unless these direct personal benefits outweigh the
costs. But intellectual products are likely to be useful also to many per-
sons other than the author, and the social desirability of eliciting new
works should be determined by that as well. Society wants new works
produced whenever total benefits (to everyone) outweigh authors' costs.
Thus, assuming authors are self-interested, some way must be found of
bringing the benefits to others to bear on the motivation of the author.
Intellectual property rights do this by prohibiting anyone from using or
enjoying the work except on terms agreed with the author. The author
may charge a price for access, and he can expect to benefit from that to
the extent that others in the marketplace expect to be able to benefit from
his work. Thus, at the margin, his decisions about the investment of time
and effort in creative activity will be responsive to the expected utility to
everyone of the product of that time and effort. By this means, useful
works will be elicited through the rational self-interest of authors up to
the point at which their social costs exceed their social benefits.
Economic arguments like the foregoing have all sorts of difficulties;
fortunately it is not my task to evaluate them here.4° If they are valid,
38. "Author" should be understood here to include the publisher, and anyone who both bears
and makes decisions about any of the initial fixed costs in producing and disseminating a new idea.
See also infra Part IX
39. These benefits are not usually at issue in an intellectual property context.
40. For a discussion, see Gillian K. Hadfield, The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Per-
spective, 38 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1992). For doubts about the economics, see Steven
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books Photocopies and Computer
Programs, 84 HAtv. L. REv. 281 (1970); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS
112-16, 139-44 (1988).
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however, they are valid on grounds of market efficiency. Despite the ref-
erence to individual cost, these grounds have nothing to do with fairness
or moral desert. The same point can be made about economic arguments
generally. A number of economists have commented adversely on the
practice, noticeable particularly in the United States, of presenting Mar-
ginal Productivity Theory as though it were a theory of reward for merit,
a theory of the just distribution of incomes.41 In fact, the obstacles to an
identification of marginal productivity with moral desert are overwhelm-
ing. The marginal productivity of a given worker does not even entail
causal responsibility for the product that is made possible by the addition
of his work.42 And the market worth of his marginal productivity is, of
course, determined by complex forces of supply and demand at least as
much as by his own character and effort.43 Such forces of supply and
demand will certainly benefit some producers (and perhaps penalize
others). But they should not therefore be construed as a matter of desert.
The point is most clearly stated by F.A. Hayek, and his argument is
worth quoting at length:
[T]he importance for the functioning of the market order of particular
prices or wages, and therefore of the incomes of the different groups
and individuals, is not due chiefly to the effects of the prices on all of
those who receive them, but to the effects of the prices on those for
whom they act as signals to change the direction of their efforts. Their
function is not so much to reward people for what they have done as to
tell them what in their own as well as in general interest they ought to
do .... [Tio hold out a sufficient incentive for those movements which
are required to maintain a market order, it will often be necessary that
the return of people's efforts do not correspond to recognizable merit,
but should show that, in spite of the best efforts of which they were
capable, and for reasons they could not have known, their efforts were
either more or less successful than they had reason to expect.44
41. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 67-78 (1976); PETER D. Mc-
CLELLAND, THE AMERICAN SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 50-66, 231-84 (1990).
42. Suppose a car needs to be pushed out of a mire and the job requires the efforts of two
people. The car's owner, having pushed ineffectively by himself, solicits the help of a passerby and
between them they succeed. The marginal value of the passerby's contribution is the rescue of the
car, and the owner, if he is rational and has no other recourse, will pay up to the value of the
automobile which he would otherwise lose. But it can hardly be said that the rescue of the car is due
to the passerby's efforts alone.
43. MCCLELLAND, supra note 41, at 60.
44. HAYEK, supra note 41, at 71-72. Hayek later reinforces the point by noting that in a
market,
[tihe consequence must be that all but the marginal sellers make a gain in excess of what
was necessary to induce them to render the services in question-just as all but the margi-
nal buyers will get what they buy for less than they were prepared to pay. The remunera-
tion of the market will therefore hardly ever seem just in the sense in which somebody





This argument of Hayek's is certainly not intended as an argument
against markets. On the contrary, he regards it as a virtue that market
rewards have nothing to do with moralistic considerations of individual
desert, and he observes that:
It is probably a misfortune that, especially in the USA, popular writers
like Samuel Smiles and Horatio Alger, and later the sociologist W.G.
Sumner, have defended free enterprise on the ground that it regularly
rewards the deserving, and it bodes ill for the future of the market
order that this seems to be the only defence of it which is understood
by the general public. That it has largely become the basis of the self-
esteem of the businessman often gives him an air of self-righteousness
which does not make him more popular.45
The Hayekian argument applies to rewards for intellectual work as
much as to other market rewards. Economically, the point of prohibiting
a "pirate" from copying someone else's song and selling it to members of
the public is that such piracy would distort the self-interested calcula-
tions that the composer must make about how to invest his marginal
energies. Should he regale the public with yet another tune or is his style
now just contributing to ennui? He cannot decide this question-or, the
knowledge that he has about this (from Hit Parades, etc.) will not have
the appropriate impact on his motivation-unless members of the public
pay him every time they want to hear a song of his. Their readiness to do
so may be based on all sorts of factors that have nothing to do with
him-how many other catchy tunes there are on the market this week,
whether the state of the world fosters a general desire to be cheered up,
and so on. It may thus have no connection with anything we could plau-
sibly call his desert. He cannot infer from the fact that his product sells
well that he is a good person; all he can infer is that it is probably worth
writing another song.
To sum up so far. We begin with an initial contrast between mate-
rial property and intellectual property-the latter tending to be based
much more directly on considerations of social utility than the former.
We find, however, that for various understandable reasons-though rea-
sons which defy logical or economic analysis-social policy arguments
for intellectual property tend to get converted into individualist argu-
ments, and thus to be assimilated much more closely to rhetoric associ-
ated with material property rights.
VI. FREE SPEECH AND FAIR USE AS SOCIAL POLICIES
In the previous Part, we examined the tendency of social policy ar-
45. Id at 74.
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guments to transform themselves into arguments of individual entitle-
ment. On the other side, the reverse ambiguity creeps in. Though the
person constrained by copyright is often seen through the lens of free
speech values as the valiant defender of dissident or satirical ideas, those
free speech values themselves--when they crop up in copyright doc-
trine-tend to get stated in social terms.
This is not unique to intellectual property law. In the jurisprudence
of free speech generally, there is great nervousness about giving a purely
individualist account of the right. Following the lead of John Stuart
Mill, the tendency is almost always to try to ground individual rights in
considerations relating to the importance of truth, progress and social
utility, and to avoid adducing justifications for rights which are them-
selves right-based. 46 Jurists seem embarrassed about insisting on
grounds of autonomy that some individual has a right to speak out if he
wants to, if they cannot show that autonomy in turn serves some other
social goal.
Be that as it may, free speech is almost always seen as a social good
in copyright and trademark law. Its value is that it sustains our demo-
cratic process, or it contributes to the dissemination of information.
Even Justice Brennan's dissent in Harper & Row47 characterized First
Amendment values in terms of "the robust public debate essential to an
enlightened citizenry."' 48 In Rosemont Enterprises, Ina v. Random
House, Inc.,4 9 the issue was put like this: "The spirit of the First Amend-
ment applies to the copyright laws at least to the extent that the courts
should not tolerate any attempted interference with the public's right to
be informed regarding matters of general interest.... ."5o From a right-
based point of view, the wording here is remarkable. Far from being an
individual right to vindicate one's autonomy by speaking out as and
when one wants-an active right that connotes liberty-the First
Amendment on this account becomes a matter of the public's right to be
the passive recipients of information.
Even those legal scholars who express concern about the easy over-
46. JOHN STUART MILT, ON LIBERTY 14 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956):
It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument
from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the
ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded
on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.
For the idea of "right-based" arguments, see DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 169-77.
47. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
48. Id at 579.
49. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert denied,
386 U.S. 1009 (1967).
50. Id at 311.
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riding of First Amendment considerations in earlier decisions5 I appear to
have a fastidious aversion to couching those values in terms of individual
liberty rights. L. Ray Patterson will go no further than to observe that
"[i]f the pen is mightier than the sword, making the pen a monopoly of
entrepreneurs who disseminate ideas threatens the very foundation of our
free society." 52 Melville Nimmer was prepared to say that free speech is
important as an end in itself not merely as a means to the achievement of
a democratic society: "the very nature of man is such that he can realize
self-fulfillment only if he is free to express himself."'5 3 But in developing
his own suggestions about the limits on an author's right to limit others'
use of the form in which he has expressed his ideas, Nimmer retreats to
the terminology of the public good. His argument is that in certain rare
cases the very expression of information or ideas may be so infused with
public interest that First Amendment considerations should prevail.
5 4
He cited the instance of photographs of the My Lai massacre as a case
where "[t]he photographic expression, not merely the idea, became essen-
tial if the public was to fully understand what occurred in that tragic
episode."55 My point is not to evaluate or criticize Nimmer's suggestion,
but to observe that once again free speech values are identified here as
matters of social interest rather than individual right. Once again, the
individualist resources for opposing a proprietary claim are trumped by
the general good.
Something similar is true of the related doctrine of "fair use." That,
too, can conjure up images of individual freedom; but they are images
that are quickly hijacked by utilitarian considerations. Though fair use is
now enshrined in statute,5 6 the doctrine is equitable in origin and its stat-
utory form is intended to mirror its development as judge-made law.
57
The usual analysis is that fair use is a "privilege in others than the owner
of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without his consent notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the
owner." 58
51. See, eg., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1132 (1979).
52. Patterson, supra note 10, at 66.
53. Nimmer, supra note 10, at 1188.
54. Id. at 1197-1200. I have adapted here David Shipley's characterization of Nimmer's views.
See Shipley, supra note 22, at 996-97.
55. Nimmer, supra note 10, at 1197. A post-Vietnam reader might regard the videotape of the
Rodney King beating as a more current example.
56. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
57. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1976).
58. HORACE BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944), cited in Rosemont En-
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We saw in Part II that a privilege may be understood in Hohfeldian
terms simply as the absence of a duty: P has a privilege to use 0 is
equivalent to P has no duty not to use 0. But the absence of a duty
constraining one's action may be conceived in two subtly different ways.
(a) One might take the view that we all begin with a legal privilege
to do everything-and that privileges are only abrogated by specific im-
positions of legal duty and then only to the extent of the specific duty
that has been imposed. That P has a privilege to do X is therefore an
indication that X has so far not been made the subject-matter of a duty.
(b) Alternatively, one might take the view that claims about privi-
lege are made only when we want to indicate a specific exemption from a
duty that would normally apply. According to this view, to talk of privi-
lege is to concede the general applicability of social obligation or obliga-
tion to others, but to indicate that there may occasionally be reasons for
departing from, limiting or overriding such obligation.
On the first reading, the baseline is liberty, and our legal privileges
are the residuum of our liberty after all our legal duties have been taken
into account. 59 On the second interpretation, the baseline is some broad
sense of duty, and our privileges are regarded as extraordinary depar-
tures from what would otherwise be the general scope of the duty.
Pragmatically, these interpretations seem appropriate in different ar-
eas. When we speak of the privilege of self defense, we seem to do so in
sense (b), because we are talking about a quite specific derogation from
the otherwise general duty to refrain from homicide. When the law
speaks, however, of a police officer's privilege to put questions to any
member of the public (though not necessarily to have them answered),
sense (a) seems more appropriate: he's just doing what anyone may do;
the specific constraints associated with his office do not extend to ordi-
nary conversation.
Given the widespread judicial perception of copyright as a monop-
oly and as prima facie undesirable for that reason, and given its status as
a specific and limited creature of statute rather than a matter of natural
obligation owed to authors, one might have thought that a privilege of
fair use would be best interpreted in sense (a). Surely the baseline in the
land of liberty is to be free from the constraints of monopoly rights set up
by statute. Indeed, the Constitution insists that such constraints are to
be strictly limited in time and scope, and privileges of fair use simply
ters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009
(1967).
59. This is similar to Hobbes's view that "Lyberties... depend on the Silence of the Law." See
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 152 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991).
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reflect those limitations, as seen from the side of those whom the statu-
tory rights would otherwise constrain. According to this model, one
should not have to make a case for a particular use, or persuade the
courts to make a dispensation from the normal rigor of intellectual prop-
erty on grounds of fairness. The situation of the fair user should be no
different, analytically, from the situation of the person who makes use of
another's work after the copyright expires.
It is clear, however, that this is not how fair use is seen. Partly, it is
a matter of the doctrine's early development in equity at a time when
intellectual property was seen more as a matter of right than as a matter
of social policy. But now that the rationale is social policy, the idea
seems to be that claims of fair use also have to be justified on policy
grounds. Whereas, sense (a) would indicate an asymmetry in the justifi-
catory burden-the citizen does not have to justify his claim to liberty, it
is the imposition of duties that needs to be justified-sense (b) takes the
privilege to be part and parcel of a whole package every bit of which
must be articulated and justified on social policy grounds.
The other thing that is going on-and we have seen this already in
Part V-is that the courts do not treat copyright unambiguously as a
matter of social policy. Often the rhetoric is that of fair use versus funda-
mental individual rights, rather than of two aspects of social policy in
tension with one another. Thus we find, for example, the Second Circuit
insisting that "[t]he fair use doctrine is not a license for corporate theft,
empowering a court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines the
underlying work contains material of possible public importance. ' 60 The
idea seems to be that all use of an author's work by another without his
permission is putatively dishonest and larcenous, and that "fair use" rep-
resents a strictly limited departure from that background prohibition on
stealing, a departure justified purely on the basis of some overriding so-
cial interest. Thus, to the extent that intellectual property itself is viewed
in an individualistic light, fair use seems in need of a social justification,
like any other constraint on private ownership.
These considerations are reinforced by the way the courts have
sometimes insisted on fair use as a privilege extended to copiers only in
their capacity as members of a community organizing and contributing
to public discussion (a community of scholars, for example) rather than
as free individuals in their own right. Said Justice Blackmun in his dis-
60. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 57,
61 (1980) (emphasis added).
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sent in Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios61 "I am aware of
no case in which the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the sole
benefit of the user has been held to be fair use." 62
When the ordinary user decides that the owner's price [that is the price
laid down by the owner of the copyright in some work the ordinary
user wants to use] is too high, and forgoes use of the work, only the
individual is the loser. When the scholar forgoes the use of a prior
work, not only does his own work suffer, but the public is deprived of
his contribution to knowledge. The scholar's work, in other words,
produces external benefits from which everyone profits. In such a case,
the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy-albeit at the first au-
thor's expense-to permit the second author to make limited use of the
first author's work for the public good. 63
I have quoted this passage for its rhetoric, not its authority-though
there's no doubt that it summarizes a long line of doctrine. It indicates
how easy it is to construe limitations on the copyright monopoly as mat-
ters of social good rather than individual freedom.
Interestingly, however, the majority in Sony came much closer to
construing fair use as a privilege in sense (a) above. Language like the
following in Justice Stevens' opinion indicates a refreshing willingness to
recognize a baseline of individual liberty in fair use discussions rather
than a baseline of obligation to authors:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither un-
limited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit ....
An unlicensed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it
conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copy- -
right statute .... [A] use that has no demonstrable effect upon the
potential market for.., the copyrighted work need not be prohibited
in order to protect the author's incentive to create .... What is neces-
sary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some mean-
ingful likelihood of future harm exists. If the intended use is for
commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a
noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated ....
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected
representatives of the millions of people who watch television every
day have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home
64
It's the last sentence in particular that embodies the approach I want to
urge. Though Justice Stevens talks of "millions of people," his is not a
doctrine of the social good. The claim is rather that there's a danger
whenever we extend intellectual property rights that we will restrict the
61. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
62. Id at 479 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 477-78.
64. Id at 429, 447, 450, 451, & 456.
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freedom of countless ordinary individuals one by one. The people jeop-
ardized are not necessarily academics or satirists contributing to the dis-
semination of knowledge and social criticism, but just plain folks trying
to live their lives and exercise their liberty in a world that surrounds and
purports to entertain them with stories, programs and ideas.
VII. SOCIAL UTILITY AND THE "No HARDSHIP" ARGUMENT
I said at the beginning of this Essay that if we are seriously inter-
ested in the moral justification of copyright and other forms of intellec-
tual property, we should consider them from the perspective of those
whose behavior they constrain. The perspective of the person con-
strained is particularly important when we are dealing, as we are in the
case of intellectual property, with a practice that claims justification on
utilitarian grounds. We say glibly that we are conferring rights as a
means to the greater public good, and that sounds fine and socially re-
spectable. Intellectual property rights are rewards or incentives, and
they serve the excellent purpose of encouraging authors. But the rewards
here are not just medals or Nobel prizes; the incentives we dole out
amount literally to restrictions on others' freedom that may be exploited
for authors' benefits. It sounds a lot less pleasant if, instead of saying we
are rewarding authors, we turn the matter around and say we are impos-
ing duties, restrictingfreedom, and inflicting burdens on certain individu-
als for the sake of the greater social good. In moral philosophy, where
suspicion of utilitarian arguments is rampant, that rings alarm bells. To
say that rights are a means to an end is one thing; but the correlative
proposition that some should be forced to bear sacrifices for the greater
social good smacks dangerously of throwing Christians to the lions for
the delectation of Roman society. It sounds like a typical utilitarian vio-
lation of Kant's injunction about not using persons as means.6
5
Now obviously it would be quite wrong to say that one must never
use people as means, or never impose a duty on any one as a means to
others' good. We use cabdrivers as means all the time, and we impose
numerous duties on public officials for our good not theirs. In fact,
Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative instructs us to
"[a]ct in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but
always at the same time as an end."' 66 The italicized phrases indicate a
65. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 96 (Herbert Paton
ed., sub nom. THE MORAL LAW 1956).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
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couple of crucial questions to be asked.
First, when we impose duties on certain people in order to provide
incentives for others for the sake of the general good, are the interests of
those who bear the duties also served by the overall good we are promot-
ing. Are they "ends" in this process as well as "means?" The answer is
sometimes "no" in the case of utilitarian calculations. If we execute a
murderer purely in order to deter later acts of murder, we may promote
the general good (if the deterrence theory works), but we will not benefit
the person who was executed. He will not have a greater security against
homicide as a result. So, absent some other justification for punishing
him in this way, he is being used merely as a means to others' ends.
Probably this is not true, however, of those who bear the burdens of
copyright. The theory of the Constitution seems to be that everyone ben-
efits from "the Progress of Science and useful Arts." The benefits will be
widely diffused-as widely as the culture itself-and there is no reason
why the beneficiaries will not include those whose copying activities have
had to be restrained in order to provide an incentive to authors.
Secondly, if we insist that a person's humanity must never be treated
merely as a means, we imply that there are limits on what may be done to
him for the sake of the social good. A rowdy individual may be
lobotomized for the sake of peace and quiet and no doubt he, in his post-
operative state, will enjoy that tranquility as much as anyone. But his
distinctive rational capacities have been done away with as a means to
that end, and that seems offensive to the Kantian principle. Anyway,
Kant or no Kant, even a utilitarian is going to want to ascertain the
extent of the costs that are opposed on those who are burdened for the
sake of the social good. Unless we know how heavy those costs are, we
will not know how advantageous the social benefits have to be in order to
outweigh them.
How much of a hardship, then, is it to be prevented from copying or
using another's work of authorship without his permission? At first
sight, the burdens seem relatively trivial. Justice Stevens' image of mil-
lions of people being prevented from taping their favorite television show
seems about as serious as it gets.67 As I said earlier,68 we are seldom
dealing here-as we are, sometimes, in the case of material property-
with matters of life and death.
It would be wrong, however, to leave the matter there. People do
not pursue costly litigation for the sake of trivia. Usually, of course, the
67. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
68. See supra part 4.
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issue is a matter of profits. Let's take an example, this time from the
music industry. A singer and a music publisher make millions by record-
ing a song that embodies a feature that musicologists call an "evaded
resolution," a feature which just happens to have been copied (along with
various other phrases) from a tune composed by somebody else.69 The
original composer sues for infringement of copyright. If his complaint is
sustained, the defendant may have to pay all his profits from the second
song to the plaintiff in damages or restitution. Surely it can be said that
this is a serious burden. The response-from the side of the original
composer-will be that it only seems a burden from an ex post perspec-
tive. Suppose, ex ante, that the second composer is contemplating the
use of the first composer's evaded resolution. He has a hunch that he
could make millions from a song incorporating the device, but reluc-
tantly he refrains out of respect for intellectual property (and because he
foresees the costly law suit that did in fact ensue). If he now draws atten-
tion to the hardship of this self-denial, is there anything in his complaint
that we should take seriously? John Locke, for one, would say there is
not: "'tis plain he desired the benefits of another's Pains, which he had
no right to."'70 Unfortunately, however, the Lockean rhetoric settles
nothing in the context of our discussion, because whether or not the sec-
ond composer has "no right" to benefit from the musical phrases of the
first is precisely the point at issue.
It is difficult, then, to state the issue in a way which does not beg the
question. Certainly all sides can agree to the following. Once the phrase
in question has been introduced into the world by the first composer,
there is a potential for a lot of money to be made by incorporating it into
other songs. Suppose the first composer knows that the second composer
has such a song in mind. Then there are two possibilities: either (i) the
second composer is permitted to market the song without the first com-
poser's consent, or (ii) he is not. In case (i) but not case (ii), the second
composer can expect to make a lot of money. Thus he may prefer case (i)
to case (ii) and regard case (ii) as a hardship to him in the straightfor-
ward sense that he will be worse off in that regime than he would be
under case (i). The opposite applies to the first composer. He will prefer
case (ii) and will reasonably regard case (i) as a hardship in the sense that
he will be worse off under that regime. So far their situations seem
symmetrical. 71
69. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988). The defendant's work was the
well-known song "Feelings."
70. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 291 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988).
71. A similar claim of symmetry is considered in Gordon, An Inquiry, supra note 27, at 1422-
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Maybe we can break this deadlock along the following lines. The
existence and activities of the second composer pose a threat to the well-
being of the first, in a way that the existence and activities of the first
composer do not pose a threat to the well-being of the second.
Had the second composer never lived or worked, the first composer
would have gone on enjoying all the profits that may be milked from the
public's appreciation of the frisson derived from the particular musical
phrases he invented. Anyone who wanted that particular quality of en-
joyment would have to deal with him. Now that the second composer
has come along, however, and composed his tune, the first composer
faces a threat to his profits, a threat which can only be fended off by
insisting on regime (ii).72
If we consider the opposite case-the difference made to the second
composer by the existence of the first-we do not get a symmetrical re-
sult. Had the first composer never lived, the contested phrase might not
have come into the world at all and so the issue would not have arisen.
The second composer would have had to do exactly what he is required
now to do by the first composer's copyright-write his own songs.
Under regime (ii), then, the second composer is no worse off than he
would be absent the first composer's activity; and possibly he is better off
under regime (ii), for the two of them can perhaps come to some mutu-
ally advantageous agreement with regard to royalties in the new tune.
The underlying argument here-that those whom intellectual prop-
erty rights constrain are no worse off as a result, and that there are thus
no net losers in a system of intellectual property-may be discerned in a
number of early economic and utilitarian treatises.7 3 Jeremy Bentham,
for example, who was adamant in other contexts that all property limits
liberty, insisted that copyright "produces an infinite [beneficial] effect,
35. But Professor Gordon's thesis is that the issues of freedom are also symmetrical as between the
parties. I shall show in Part VIII that this is not the case. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying
text.
72. Of course this branch of the argument is a little far-fetched, for it assumes that there is only
a limited amount of profit to be made from the musical use of the contested phrase. It assumes in
other words some sort of zero-sum game as between the first and second composer. That, I think, is
the presupposition of much intellectual property jurisprudence. In reality, of course, the situation is
likely to be positive-sum. By embodying the first composer's evaded resolution in a new song, the
second composer may enhance the public appetite for such music and may even create a demand for
other songs of that type (including the first composer's song) that would not have existed but for the
second composition. Having heard "Feelings," the public may well be as inclined or even more
inclined to purchase the plaintiff's song "Pour Toi" than they were before. I am grateful to Carol
Sanger for this point.
73. I am indebted to Hadfield, supra note 40, at 26-33, for some of these sources.
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and it costs nothing."' 74 The theme is echoed in the following discussion
of patents by an economist in 1907. The owner of intellectual property:
is allowed to have an exclusive control of something which otherwise
might not and often would not have come into existence at all. If it
would not,-if the patented article is something which society without
a patent system would not have secured at all,-the inventor's monop-
oly hurts nobody. It is as though in some magical way he had caused
springs of water to flow in the desert or loam to cover barren moun-
tains or fertile islands to rise from the bottom of the sea. His gains
consist in something from which no one loses, even while he enjoys
them... .75
And it is summed up by John Stuart Mill to defend in general the recog-
nition of private property rights for producers over the objects they have
made. "It is no hardship to any one, to be excluded from what others
have produced: they were not bound to produce it for his use, and he
loses nothing by not sharing in what otherwise would not have existed at
all." 76
However, although the "no hardship" argument sounds plausible,
there is a fallacy in it, which a hypothetical example will illustrate.
7 7
Suppose Q is dying of a disease for which he knows there is no cure;
he resigns himself to his fate and prepares for a stoic death. Then the
news comes in: a drug has been developed which will remit the disease.
The person who made and tested it, P, did so in his own laboratory with
his own hands using his own materials. P makes the drug available to a
number of his friends, but excludes Q because he dislikes Q's politics.
Clearly Q will suffer something as a result of this. Instead of the stoic
death he prepared for, it is likely that the rest of his life will be spent in
painful bitterness and anger as he endures the thought that he might have
lived and flourished but will not, thanks to P's exercise of this exclusion-
ary right.
Someone may object that although Q certainly suffers, he suffers no
real loss or injury. In strictly material terms, they will say, he is no
worse off than he was before P acquired and exercised his property right.
Indeed-to pursue the line we were taking-he is no worse off than he
74. JEREMY BENTHAM, A MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 71 (John Bowring ed., 1839),
cited in Hadfield, supra note 40, at 26.
75. CLARK, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC THEORY 360-61 (1907), cited in Hadfield, supra note
40, at 28.
76. 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR AP-
PLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, ch. 2, § 6, excerpted in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITI-
CAL POSITIONS 96 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978).
77. What follows is adapted from Waldron, supra note 2.
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would have been had P never existed at all, or never gone into the phar-
maceutical business.
But the point is not conclusive. Material loss, relative to a given
baseline, need not be the only sort of hardship people experience. Clearly
the establishment and exercise of the property right that we have out-
lined occasions some degree of suffering and in that sense makes the re-
mainder of the diseased person's life somewhat worse (for him) than it
would otherwise have been. Q is not feigning his distress at the knowl-
edge that P proposes to withhold the drug. There is real misery here that
could be relieved, a real bitterness that could be assuaged, and these feel-
ings are directly related to the recognition of exclusive property rights in
the new artifact. Until we have said something about why such exper-
iences of additional suffering do not matter, we have not finished address-
ing the question of justification so far as P's property rights are
concerned.
In other words, there is a host of questions to be asked before we can
conclude that intellectual property rights pose no hardship to those
whom they constrain. Does deprivation take on a different character,
objectively or subjectively, depending on the counterfactuals implicit in
the "no hardship" argument? Are humans the sort of creatures who are
-constantly able to refer their suffering to the existence of such baselines,
so that they take comfort from the fact that they are no worse off than
they would be under some alternative scenario? Does this affect how
certain deprivations are experienced, and how easy it is to endure them?
Does it alter the impact of a given deprivation on self-esteem? If it does
not, what are the consequences for persons likely to be when such hard-
ships are nevertheless imposed? These are the questions that must be
answered, and their general character indicates that a premise of "no
hardship" is perhaps the least fruitful starting point for a genuine justifi-
catory inquiry.78
Let me briefly summarize where we have got to. The "no hardship"
argument was introduced to break what appeared to be a deadlock in the
suggestion that intellectual property restrictions are costly for those on
whom they are imposed. The deadlock arose out of an attempt by the
78. Very similar issues are involved also in discussions of material property. Many theorists
defend a version of what is sometimes known as "the Lockean Proviso"-that a unilateral appropri-
ation of material resources as private property by some individual is permissible if (and only if) no
one else's situation is worsened thereby. See LOCKE, supra note 70, at 291; cf. Jeremy Waldron,
Enough and as Good Left for Others, 29 PHIL. Q. (1979). See also ROBERT NOZiCK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA 175-82 (1984); DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS By AGREEMENT 190-232 (1986).




defenders of intellectual property to characterize harm to copiers as no
more than the opportunity cost of their refraining from inflicting harm
on authors. It seemed possible to describe the matter either way--either
authors' rights impose losses on copiers or copiers' privileges impose
losses on authors. The "no hardship" argument fails to break this dead-
lock because, as we have just seen, it is simply not true that people never
suffer from being denied something that would not have existed but for
another's efforts. So we are back with the deadlock again.
VIII. THE ISSUE OF LIBERTY
Perhaps instead of looking at the matter in terms of loss and harm,
with all the attendant confusions about baselines and counterfactuals-
who would have suffered what, if someone else hadn't existed, etc.-we
should approach the matter in terms of the effect of intellectual property
upon liberty. I have hinted at this already, in the discussion of
Hohfeldian correlativity in Part II and the discussion of various senses of
"privilege" in Part VI. To impose a duty (e.g., a duty of non-copying
without consent of a work of authorship) one must limit the freedom of
ordinary people, the argument would run, and that is prima facie an ob-
jectionable thing to do, certainly something not to be undertaken lightly.
The initial difficulty with this libertarian perspective is that liberty-
at least, in any sense which could sustain a moral presumption of the
kind just mentioned-is a heavily contested concept. 79 All laws limit lib-
erty in some sense; so unless one's baseline is anarchism, there is still a
question about whether laws of intellectual property affect liberty in any
specially important sense that would take them out of the run of ordinary
legislation, so far as moral justification is concerned.
If the suggestion is, for example, that intellectual property infringes
a moral right to liberty, then the behavior it constrains must be identified
as having a special moral significance. For a right to liberty cannot be a
right to negative freedom as some sort of undifferentiated commodity.
As Charles Taylor points out, "we make discriminations between obsta-
cles as representing more or less serious infringements of freedom."8 0 A
law that forbids me from worshipping according to my beliefs is a blow
to liberty in a way that a law that regulates traffic at intersections is not.
In the latter case, Taylor argues, "we are reluctant to speak... of a loss
79. See. eg., W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROc. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'y 167
(1955-56); John Gray, On Liberty, Liberalism and Essential Contestability, 8 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 385
(1978).
80. Charles Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty?, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 182 (Alan Ryan ed., 1979).
[VIol. 68:841
FROM A UTHORS TO COPIERS
of liberty at all; what we feel we are trading off is convenience against
safety."
81
Which category do the restrictions imposed by intellectual property
fall into? Are they more like restrictions on freedom of worship, or are
they like the restrictions that form part-of ordinary traffic law. There are
a number of different ways of answering this question, a number of differ-
ent ways in which we might try to differentiate between those freedoms
that are important enough to be the subject of a right and those that are
not.
A. Hardship
One way of approaching the matter would be to show that there is
something particularly onerous about the limitation on liberty that intel-
lectual property imposes-to show, in other words, that the restrictions
in this case impose hardship or are difficult to bear. But that would take
us straight back to the deadlock established in the previous Part.
B. "Natural" Liberty
A slightly different approach-but a variation on the "no hardship"
argument-is suggested by some remarks of Henry Sidgwick. Sidgwick
acknowledged that there was some plausibility to the view that copyright
limits freedom. After all, he said, copyright consists of prohibitions.8 2
He regarded it nevertheless as ultimately superficial: "It can hardly be an
interference with A's natural liberty to exclude him, in the interest of B,
from the gratuitous use of utilities which he could not possibly have en-
joyed except as a result of B's labour."' 83
The emphasis here is on "natural liberty"-a concept that was used
often by Adam Smith to define the baseline of a free economy.84 But
what does it mean to call a class of liberties "natural"? To sustain Sidg-
wick's argument, the class of A's natural liberty must comprise those
81. Id. A similar approach had already been taken by Ronald Dworkin. See DwoRKIN, supra
note 8, at 269:
If the government chooses to make Lexington Avenue one-way down town, it is a sufficient
justification that this would be in the general interest, and it would be ridiculous for me to
argue that for some reason it would nevertheless be wrong. The vast bulk of the laws which
diminish my liberty are justified on utilitarian grounds, as being in the general interest or
for the general welfare; if, as Bentham supposes, each of these laws diminishes my liberty,
they nevertheless do not take away from me any thing that I have a right to have.
82. HENRY SIDGWICK, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 83 (1887), quoted in Hadfield,
supra note 40, at 32.
83. Id.
84. Cf. 2 ADAM SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 208 (E. Cannan ed., 1976) ("All systems
either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and
simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord.").
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actions he could perform absent any action by or interaction with other
people. But why does "natural-ness" in this sense count for anything?
Why privilege this class of actions as those to which important issues of
liberty peculiarly pertain? After all, we do not live in a Rousseauian state
of nature, wandering independently and barely ever running across one
another. We live in a world constituted by the actions and achievements
of others, and that now is the only environment in which there can be
any question of our freedom. Which liberties are important to us and
which are not must be defined in relation to our world and not in relation
to some primeval state of nature.
C. Self-Regarding versus Other-Regarding Freedoms
A third approach is to say that there is a special moral presumption
in favor of a right to perform actions that do not encroach on the free-
dom of action of anyone else. This of course is John Stuart Mill's posi-
tion in On Liberty: '"he only part of the conduct of anyone for which he
is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute."8 5 Ac-
tions that impinge on others' actions may be dealt with, quite properly,
by ordinary legislation justified on utilitarian grounds. It is only self-
regarding actions that attract the special protection of a moral right to
liberty. This is also Immanuel Kant's position: the coercion of the law,
Kant argued, may be used only to restrain coercion. 6 It follows that if
the copier's actions do not impinge on anyone else's freedom, they should
not be made the target of coercive laws (such as copyright).
Do the actions that our copier wishes to perform encroach upon
others' freedom? Do they, in particular, encroach upon the authors' free-
dom or that of the assignees of his copyright? This is an intriguing ques-
tion, and one that needs to be approached carefully.
Objects of property can be divided into two classes: those that are
"crowdable" and those that are "non-crowdable." An object is "crowd-
able" if one person's use of it is an obstacle to at least one other's use of
it.87 The computer that I am using as I compose this sentence is crowd-
85. MILL, supra note 46, at 13.
86. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 36 (John Ladd ed., 1965):
Coercion ... is a hindrance or opposition to freedom. Consequently, if a certain use of
freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom according to universal laws (that is, is unjust), then
the use of coercion to counteract it, inasmuch as it is the prevention of a hindrance to
freedom, is consistent with freedom according to universal laws; in other words, this use of
coercion is just.
87. For the distinction, see MICHAEL LAVER, THE POLrITICS OF PRIVATE DESIRES: THE
GUIDE TO THE POLITICS OF RATIONAL CHOICE 30-32 (1981).
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able; it is a small desk-top machine that can be used for word-processing
only by one person at a time. Any attempt by you to use it would inter-
fere with my freedom to use it. The apple I am eating is crowdable in a
slightly different sense; my consumption of it makes it unavailable for
others' use forever, not just during the period of my use. The striking
thing about intellectual products is that they are non-crowdable.
Although only one person can read a given copy of a novel at a given
time, any number of people may enjoy the prose contained therein with-
out diminishing anyone else's enjoyment, and of course it's the prose not
the physical book that is the subject of intellectual property. The point
seems to apply to copying as much as to reading. If I copy a passage
from one of the other essays in this Symposium, the other essay remains
as it was, undiminished, for others to read (and, if they want, to copy) as
before. Copying a piece of prose does not wear it out; any number of
people can copy the same passage (provided they have access to its physi-
cal embodiment) at the same time.
It seems to follow from this feature of non-crowdability, that a cop-
ier's use of an author's prose can not impact on anyone else's actions, and
so a fortiori cannot impact on the author's freedom of action. Since all
objects of intellectual property have this feature, it seems to follow that
all the infringements which intellectual property rules prohibit fall into
the Kant/Mill category of acts that have no discernable impact on any-
one else's freedom. This conclusion-if it can be sustained-would pro-
vide the basis for a powerful libertarian objection to intellectual property
rules.
Few people think it can be sustained. In my experience the argu-
ment of the previous two paragraphs is viewed by ordinary folks (partic-
ularly authors) as a piece of academic sophistry. Of course the author's
freedom is affected, they will retort. And many of them add: "He is no
longer free to make the profits that he could have made in the absence of
the copier's infringement."
Among intellectual property scholars, however, only Wendy
Gordon has attempted to develop this retort into a broad, abstract argu-
ment against the libertarian position."" Gordon wants to show that the
issue of liberty is as deadlocked as the issue of harm and hardship that we
discussed in Part VII. She argues as follows:
If compulsion were sufficient grounds for the copier to object to a legal
regime of copyright, then compulsion would also be sufficient grounds
for the work's creator to object to the user's compulsion, because the
88. Gordon, An Inquiry, supra note 27, at 1425-35.
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user will employ his privilege to do things with the work which the
creator would prefer he not do. In many ways, then, the user's and
creator's interests in being free from compulsion appear symmetrical.8 9
This argument, as it stands, does not work. The mere fact that some
action is performed which the author would prefer were not performed is
not at all an encroachment on his freedom. I would prefer that no one
vote for the GOP candidate in the 1996 presidential election, but my
freedom will not be affected if millions do (at least not by the mere fact of
their voting Republican). Gordon may not say in response that the copy-
right case is different inasmuch as there it is a matter of the author's
preference vis-a-vis his own work. Whether the work is to be regarded as
his own in the relevant sense is exactly the point at issue. So although it
is evident that the copier's activities may frustrate the author's prefer-
ences, that fact no more takes copying out of the privileged Kant/Mill
category, than the fact that my Episcopalianism might frustrate a Mus-
lim's preferences takes my religious practice out of that category.
Gordon backs up the bad argument we have just discussed with two
others. In a paragraph following the one just quoted, she seems to sug-
gest that the relevant symmetry is between the copier's being prevented
from copying and the author's being prevented from stopping the copier
from affecting his interests. 90 But this is based on a mistaken view about
what a copier's privilege would amount to. At the moment a copier is
under a duty to refrain from using the author's work, that duty (or its
enforcement) restricts his freedom. If the duty is removed, what the cop-
ier will have is a Hohfeldian privilege, which is simply equivalent to the
absence of a duty.9 1 It is a further question whether this should be rein-
forced with a claim-right imposing a duty on the author (equally burden-
some to liberty) requiring him not to do anything to copiers who use his
work.9 2 Those who complain that their liberty is compromised by duties
89. Id. at 1431.
90. I am inferring this line of argument from a response she attributes to the copier: "a copier's
advocate might argue that there is a real difference between being stopped from doing something...
and being frustrated in one's ability to stop others from affecting one's interests." Id. Gordon goes
on to present other arguments to deny this asymmetry also. Id at 1432-33.
91. I suspect from some of her earlier discussions that Gordon is quite confused about the
concept of a privilege. She says, "In the Hohfeldian lexicon, a privilege is also an entitlement-an
entitlement to be free from government interference." Id at 1398. In fact, it was the aim of
Hohfeld's analysis to avoid claims like this: what Gordon calls an entitlement is a combination of a
privilege and a claim-right (not to be interfered with). Such Hohfeldian molecules may be common,
see supra note 4 and accompanying text, but that is no excuse for ignoring their atomic structure.
92. Ex hypothesi, the author cannot sue to enforce a duty, since the copier's privilege indicates
the absence of any such duty. But there may be other things he could do, like harass the copier or
mount a legal campaign on some basis other than an infringement of duty. For an example, see
Governors of the Bd. of Hosp. for Sick Children v. Walt Disney Enters., I All E.R. 1005 (1967).
Walt Disney Enterprises were held liable to the owners of the copyright in Peter Pan for objecting to
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to respect copyright need not be demanding this extra level of protection.
So they need not be taken, as Gordon takes them, to be proposing a
symmetrical restriction on the liberty of authors.
Gordon's final argument is the familiar one that a copiers' privilege
would undermine the author's freedom to make a profit from his work.
93
There is no doubt that such a privilege would undermine the profitability
of authorship. But it is much less clear that it does so by restricting
freedom. The profitability of authorship needs to be guaranteed by mo-
nopoly rules, since absent such rules authors would be unable to con-
vince as many people to pay as much for authorized copies of their
works. But inability is not the same as lack of freedom. 94 I may be un-
able to sell fresh water in Scotland where the stuff falls in bucketfuls from
the sky, but my liberty is hardly affected thereby. No doubt, I could
make a profit if the Scottish Office granted me a monopoly on water-
rights (no one to use any water anywhere without a license purchased
from me). Such a monopoly would be coercive so far as other people
were concerned, since it would have to prohibit and prevent their free use
of water. But the effect it would have on their liberty is not matched by
any effect their freedom would have on mine if the monopoly were not
established. Though I would receive less money, no assault would be
made upon my freedom by the Scottish Office's refusal to give me exclu-
sive water-rights.
Indeed I can think of only one feature that distinguishes water and
intellectual property, so far as the monopolist's freedom is concerned. In
the case of water, the commodity in question falls unbidden (and often
unwelcome) from the sky.95 In the case of intellectual property, a work
of authorship is deliberately created and it is the author's decision to
send it out into the public realm where it becomes in effect physically
available for copiers' use. That decision may create important issues of
the author's freedom, for some actions by copiers may interfere with it.
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,9 6 the defendant
a new movie proposal (to star Audrey Hepburn in the title role) in violation of a contractual under-
taking not to do so.
93. Again, I am reconstructing this argument from hints in the text. Gordon observes that
authors' "being unable to collect as much profit as they desire" is a "form of compulsion." An
Inquiry, supra note 27, at 1431.
94. See ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1970) which states:
If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am
blind, or cannot understand the darker pages of Hegel, it would be eccentric to say that I
am to that degree enslaved or coerced .... Mere inability to attain a goal is not lack of
political freedom.
(footnotes omitted).
95. I am thinking of Scotland; none of this applies in California.
96. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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magazine was sued (among other things) for infringing Gerald Ford's
right to determine when and where his memoirs would be first published.
Having purloined his manuscript, The Nation scooped Ford's publisher
and their initial licensees, Time Magazine, giving his words an initial air-
ing in a forum hardly congenial to the author.97 By doing so, they
clearly undermined Ford's freedom to determine where his work would
first be presented to the public.98 In this case, then, the freedom they
claimed (as a matter of fair use) did impact on Ford's freedom, and so
would not fall into the specially favored Kant/Mill category that we have
been considering in this subpart. But it is a mistake, as we have seen, to
generalize from this particular case to any broader proposition that a
copier's activity as such necessarily compromises the liberty of the au-
thor whose work he is using.99
D. Liberty versus License
Whether or not copiers' actions encroach on liberty, they may still
be doing something wrong.t°0 Can this be used as a basis for disqualify-
ing their claim to liberty? We often say that freedom of action which
violates moral duty is not liberty but license.t01 If the copiers' claim is
97. Id at 542.
98. See id. at 559. We should note, however, that the majority emphasized mainly the commer-
cial value of the right of first publication rather than its importance as a matter of liberty. Id. at 562.
For a more high-minded view of the importance of control over self-disclosure in this context, see
Lynn Sharp Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justification of Intellectual Property: A Comment on Het-
tinger, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247, 251-56 (1989).
99. There is not space here to discuss what are sometimes referred to as authors' "moral
rights"-e.g., the insistence in Article 6 of the Berne Convention on Intellectual Property that
"(i]ndependently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the
author shall have the right... to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of... the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation." Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 art. 6 bis. Though legislation of this provi-
sion was expressly excluded by the Incorporation Act of 1988, the ideal of moral rights is neverthe-
less making some headway in case law. See eg., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d
14, 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that broadcast of a bowdlerized version of the Monty Python
comedy show may constitute an infringement of copyright if the Monty Python group had consented
only to their being broadcast in their entirety). For the purposes of our argument, moral rights (to
the extent they are recognized) may fall into much the same category as the right to determine
exactly where and how one's work may be first published.
100. Cf Gordon, An Inquiry, supra note 27, at 1434 ("Alternatively, an author's advocate might
abandon the debate about whether rights or privileges need justification more. She might argue in-
stead that 'the law ought to do what is morally required' and contend that it is morally wrong for
users to take unconsented advantage of others' efforts." (citation omitted) (quoting JEFFREY MUR-
PHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 191 (1984)).
101. The distinction is familiar to students of property from its use in John Locke's political
philosophy. Though the state of nature "be a State of Liberty," he says, "yet it is not a State of
Licence." 2 LOCKE, supra note 70, at 270:
Freedom is not, as we are told, A Liberty for every Man to do what he lists: (For who could
be free, when every other man's Humour might domineer over him?) But a Liberty to
dispose, and order, as he lists, his Person, Actions, and Possessions, and his whole Prop-
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merely a demand for license to act wrongly and irresponsibly, it can
hardly be used as a basis for imposing a heavier-than-usual burden of
justification on those who support intellectual property law.
Some of our moral intuitions support this position. Most of us agree
that plagiarism, for example, is wrong-that it is wrong deliberately to
take another's work, in whole or in part, and mislead others into thinking
it is one's own. It is wrong to try to get credit (or in the academic case,
advancement) by this means. But the wrongness here is largely the
wrongness of deception-or, to put it bluntly, lying-about the prove-
nance of one's work. The right to do that is seldom what the opponents
of copyright are asking for. They want the freedom to build upon, incor-
porate, and satirize others' works in an environment where no one would
be under any illusion about what was going on. The last point is impor-
tant. In a world dominated by copyright, the popular assumption is that
a work published under a given author's name is that author's own work
and nobody else's. To incorporate elements of others' work in such a
world is to give a misleading impression of originality unless there is
clear notice to the contrary. But what copiers are urging is that the
world cease to be dominated by copyright (and the attendant under-
standings) in this way.
Beyond the case of plagiarism, it is hard to sustain the liberty/li-
cense distinction in this area without resting it on one of the other argu-
ments, or without begging other questions, that we have been
considering. It is surely wrong to harm authors-we have already seen
that there is a deadlock concerning the balance of harms in the intellec-
tual property issue. It is morally right perhaps to give authors a reward
for their troubles-but we have already seen that the issue is precisely
whether a reward for authors should be purchased at the cost of others'
freedom. It is no doubt wrong for copiers to impede the progress of the
sciences and useful arts-but copiers complain that they are bearing un-
due costs in the quest for these benefits (and many claim also that exactly
the same goal would be better served by the regime they advocate).
E. From Freedom to Autonomy
A final move that may be made in the debate about liberty is to
consider whether we can connect the liberty-claim made by copiers to
erty, within the allowance of those Laws under which he is; and therein not to be subject to
the arbitrary Will of another, but freely follow his own.
Id. at 306. There is an excellent discussion of the liberty versus license distinction in ROGER




some deeper and more discriminating value such as individual autonomy.
The move from run-of-the-mill freedom to autonomy is common in mod-
em political philosophy.102 The latter value has been described by Jo-
seph Raz: "The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people
controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through suc-
cessive decisions throughout their lives."' 0 3 An individual lives autono-
mously when the shape and character of his life (relationships, career,
etc.) reflect choices that he has made at various points among a range of
available options. The complex relation between autonomy and freedom
consists in the fact that while the choices in question must be free, one
does not need free choice over everything in order to be autonomous.
Some choices are more determinative than others of how one's life will be
shaped, and-though people may differ in this-we form for political and
educational purposes a sense of which types of choices tend to be particu-
larly strategic in this regard. Free choice of sexual partner, for example,
and freedom of choice concerning reproduction seem absolutely funda-
mental to the modem conception of the autonomous individual, i.e., the
individual who chooses the overall shape of his own life. These are
choices that pervade the nature and quality of almost all the remainder of
one's life. But no one could plausibly think that about such things as the
trivial actions routinely regulated by traffic laws for the sake of the gen-
eral welfare. Barring extraordinary cases, no one can say that driving in
any particular direction on a one-way street is crucial or strategic for his
autonomy. There is a strong presumption, then, against interfering with
liberties of the former sort-and accordingly, they are characteristically
made the subject-matter of rights-claims-whereas, for liberties of the
latter sort, any old mundane economic justification will do.
For our purposes, the freedom-claim that may Seem particularly
germane to autonomy is a claim for freedom of expression. Man is a
speaking being, and self-expression is part of our essence.1 °4 The choice
of when and how to express oneself seems particularly strategic in the
overall determination of the shape and character of one's life-particu-
larly if we grant that the character of one's life is partly a matter of pres-
entation of self to others.
The trouble is that an ideal like autonomy cuts both ways in our
102. See Taylor, supra note 80, at 181-84; JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 407-12
(1986); GERLD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 13-14 (1988).
103. RAZ, supra note 102, at 369. For a discussion of Raz's conception, see Jeremy Waldron,
Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL- L. REv. 1097 (1989).
104. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 3 (Stephen Everson ed., 1988) ("Nature, as we often say,
makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech.").
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debate. Authors will claim that the integrity of their self-expression is
compromised by the use and adaptation of its content by others.10 5 Walt
Disney may feel that his purpose in creating the cheerful scrubbed faces
of Mickey and Minnie Mouse is undermined by the Air Pirates' carica-
ture-and the latter can hardly deny that this was their intention. 10 6 In
turn, copiers will claim that their ability to express themselves autono-
mously-as parodists, pastiche artists or whatever-is impeded by the
restrictions that authors' rights place upon them. So once again we have
an impasse; invocation of the value of autonomy settles nothing.
For copiers, especially, the impasse is complicated by a philosophi-
cal connection between autonomy and the very idea of authorship. "Au-
tonomy is an ideal of self-creation," says Joseph Raz, "The autonomous
person is part author of his life."10 7 The connection presents them with
something of a dilemma. On the one hand, copiers make demands in the
name of individual liberty and of their status as autonomous agents; it
seems outrageous to them that free expression and their use of cultural
materials should be restricted when such expression is crucial to their
self-constitution. On the other hand, it is part of their case to try and
undermine the myth of originality and authorship, to stress that we are
always indebted to others, always building on scraps of others' achieve-
ment, even in what seem to be our most creative moments. They argue
that the law should recognize that, and accordingly remove impediments
to the free and explicit circulation of ideas. That argument is fine, in
itself, but it seems ironic that they are sustaining it by appeal to a value of
autonomy that involves the very ideas of originality and self-creation ex
nihilo that they are attempting to undermine.
IX. THE DECONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHOR
The irony we have just noticed accords with the general instability
we discerned earlier in the ontological terms in which moral positions on
intellectual property are presented. We began in Part III with the view
that private property in material resources tends to be defended in indi-
vidualist terms and attacked in social terms. In Part IV, we noted that
with intellectual property it is the other way round: the official defense is
social utility and the objections are on grounds of individual freedom.
But no sooner had we identified this contrast than it began to dissolve.
The social arguments in defense of copyright tend to get converted into
105. See, e.g., Shipley, supra note 22.
106. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978).
107. RAZ, supra note 102, at 370.
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arguments about what individual authors deserve (Part V), and liberta-
rian impatience with restrictions on the use of intellectual products gets
transformed into arguments about what society needs for the free flow of
ideas (Part VI). Since then we seem to have run into nothing but dead-
lock and circularity: hardship to authors is matched by hardship to copi-
ers (Part VII); and claims of liberty just send us around the circle of
argument once again, as they constantly refer to other values in a debate
to which it was hoped they would offer an independent contribution.
There are many scholars to whom these paradoxes and ironies will
come as no surprise. Deconstructionist or post-modernist scholars speak
often of the collapse of the traditional idea of the subject and of the corre-
sponding antithesis between individual and social categories. 08 That in-
dividualist and social utility ideas switch their character back and forth is
exactly what one should expect on this approach.
In the areas that interest us in this Symposium, the talk is often of
"the Death of the Author." It is said that the ideas about authorship and
originality which characterize the rhetoric of intellectual property are
not immutable Platonic categories. They are ideas of quite recent prove-
nance-a product largely of the Romantic cult of the individual creative
artists; as cultural categories they have been wrecked beyond retrieval by
the conditions of modem life and the conundrums of post-modem the-
ory. It is said that in the circumstances of contemporary cultural pro-
duction, there is no entity to fill the role of author-source of the original
spark of creative genius, responsible for something entirely new-that
copyright and other intellectual property concepts make so crucial. The
view, as far as I understand it, is that ideas, words and images circulate
freely and haphazardly in a sort of cultural maelstrom, and that we speak
more or less arbitrarily of works of authorship whenever some combina-
tion of ideas, words and images crystallizes' °9 out of the maelstrom for
long enough to catch our attention. This way of thinking emphasizes the
unbounded nature of interpretation, with Hamlet being in effect rewrit-
ten or reconstructed every time it is read. It highlights the pastiche char-
acter of modem cultural products, with no credibility whatever attaching
to the idea that anything is entirely new. At the level of the work itself,
there is nothing sufficiently enduring or distinctive to be regarded as a
thing whose originality must be respected. At the level of author, the
general deconstruction of the human subject adds to the specific sense, in
108. See eg., John Forrester, A Brief History of the Subject, in THE REAL ME: POST-MODERN-
ISM AND THE QUESTION OF IDENTrrY (Lisa Appignanesi ed., 1987).
109. Mixed metaphors are not just excusable, but de rigeur in discussions like this.
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the cultural context, that there is no one individual to take credit for a
given production, and no enduring person in whom rights over a given
production could be vested in any non-arbitrary way. 110
Sometimes, indeed, it is said that the modem creation of the cate-
gory of the author of a work is a response to the needs and exigencies of
copyright law rather than the other way round. There is not space to
retell that story here.II But the idea is that what law can construct, law
can deconstruct. It is the contention of Jane Gaines, and other scholars
in this field, that by allowing intellectual property rights to circulate as
commodities-vesting often in great studios and publishing houses, to
the extent that they come to rest at all-modern law shatters the connec-
tion between author and work, no less effectively than modem capitalism
shatters the connection between individual laborer and the product com-
modity that emerges from an assembly line.'1 2
If these lines of thought can be sustained, they certainly undermine
any argument for authorial entitlement based on Lockean natural rights.
Lockean arguments for intellectual property can seem very tempting at
first sight. Copyright seems like a legal vindication of the intensely per-
sonal relation between an individual and the fruits of his intellectual la-
bor. Indeed, intellectual property can appear more justifiable along these
lines than the topic of Locke's own concern-property in material re-
sources. Unlike the ownership of land, intellectual property does not in-
volve giving people rights over resources that were arguably created for
all men to enjoy. What copyright appears to uphold are rights of pure
agency, rights in something that literally did not exist in any form before
the author put his mind to work. As one author put it, "intellectual
property is... the only absolute possession in the whole world .... The
man who brings out of nothingness some child of his thought has rights
therein which cannot belong to any other sort of property .... ,1 13
But such an appearance is terribly vulnerable to the philosophical
110. There is an excellent discussion in JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE,
THE VOICE, AND THE LAW 1-41, 51-83 (1991). See also Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, 20
SCREEN 13, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUC'URALIST CRITICISM 141 (Jo-
suE V. Harari ed., 1979); UMBERTO ECo, SEMIOTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 45
(1986).
111. For a moderate version of this thesis, see L. RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (1968). For a more radical version, see Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donald-
son v. Beckett and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988). There is
also a good discussion in GAINES, supra note 110, at 61-62. [ am grateful to my colleague Robert
Post for some discussion of these ideas.
112. See generally GAINES, supra note 110; BERNARD EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE:
ELEMENTS FOR A MARXIST THEORY OF LAW (1979).
113. Nathaniel Shaler, quoted in Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Reform: Legislation and Interna-
tional Copyright, 14 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 343, 358 (1939).
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vicissitudes of the individual subject. If an individual's personality is it-
self a cultural product, we are hardly in a position to say with John
Locke that "every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body
has any Right to but himself."114 And if the production of a "work of
authorship," far from creation ex nihilo, is simply the crystallization of
an arresting combination of phrases and images in the vicinity of some-
one sitting at a desk with a pen in his hand, the latter can hardly base
claims to exclusive rights over the product on the ground that "being
Master of himself... [he] had.., in himself the great Foundation of
Property."115
The post-modem argument, then, threatens to undermine the intel-
lectual credentials of that portion of judicial "common-sense" 116 on intel-
lectual property that is Lockean or natural-rights-based in character. (Of
course as we have seen already a number of times, the fact that such
rhetoric is intellectually disreputable seems in no way a bar to its use by
judges.)
Interestingly, however, it may have little impact on the official in-
centives-for-social-benefit argument in favor of copyright. On the eco-
nomic argument, particularly if it is understood along the lines of the
Hayekian strictures I discussed in Part V, nothing whatever hinges on
the integrity of the author as subject. After all, in the official story, the
aim of intellectual property law is not to give Lockean credit to authors
as such. From the economic point of view, who cares whether there are
any enduring personalities-individual founts of original genius-whose
talents we can match with their deserts? All the economic analysis re-
quires is that there be decision-makers in the production of works of au-
thorship-preferably self-interested decision-makers who will respond to
price signals in considering whether to produce yet more items to be cir-
culated and deconstructed in the marketplace.
Maybe the post-modernist argument tends to deconstruct rational
choice as well-and that would pose serious difficulties for the economic
approach. But then it would have nothing particular to do with "the
114. LOCKE, supra note 70, at 287.
115. Id. at 298.
116. For the idea of "common-sense" in judging, see GAINES, supra note 110, at 12:
Yes, judges do apply legal rules and principles, and yes, most of what they write in their
opinions pertains to the review of precedent and the clarification of points of law. But that
purely legal discourse is often mixed with pithy sayings, homely analogies, personal judg-
ments, and frank characterizations. What I mean by defining this knowledge as 'common-
sense is that it is drawn directly out of the reservoir of shared knowledge in the culture, the
common pool of norms, beliefs, and values from which we all draw in our attempts to
make sense of the world.
See also text accompanying note 30.
880 [Vol. 68:841
FROM A UTHORS TO COPIERS
Death of the Author," and nothing particular to do with intellectual
property. It would undermine all economic justifications of law and-if
it were taken to an extreme-it would render meaningless concern of
every kind for the fate of the individual person.
X. COPIERS AND CULTURES
Ironically, it is copiers, not authors, whose position in this debate is
more affected by the post-modern arguments. We saw at the end of Part
VIII that some of the claims to liberty made in behalf of copiers (particu-
larly autonomy-based claims) are vulnerable to their own denigration of
the importance of authorship and originality. Obviously the post-mod-
em critique exacerbates this. To the extent that that critique undermines
the traditional liberal subject, it of course undermines any claim for free-
dom or autonomy that such a subject may make.
At the same time, however, the post-modern critique can enhance
our sense of the hardships and dilemmas that people-fragmented pas-
tiches that they are-face in a world dominated by intellectual property.
It can affect the way we judge them morally, and it can also affect our
estimation of the burden they have to bear for the sake of the rewards we
are conferring upon authors.
If anything like the post-modern story is accepted, or even if one just
reflects a little on what it really means to write a book, compose a song or
conceive an image in a modem world saturated with culture, one will
hardly be surprised, let alone outraged, to hear that a given author's
work incorporates or makes use of elements that are familiar to us al-
ready. In a world dominated by television, in a physical environment
over-borne by advertising, in conversation increasingly loaded with, like,
catch-phrases, it is the idea of the totally new that should surprise us.
That an author's work should be completely original rather than deriva-
tive, so far from being a moral or legal requirement, would strike most
sensible observers as supererogatory.
Now we all know that the law attempts to handle this with the doc-
trine that it is not ideas whose use is limited by intellectual property
rights, but only the mode of their expression. But even the courts ac-
knowledge the unhelpfulness of the distinction,1 17 and of course from the
post-modern perspectives we have been considering, such a distinction
117. Chuck Blore & Don Richman Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising, Inc., 674 F.Supp. 671, 676 (D.
Minn. 1987) ("The first axiom of copyright is that copyright protection covers only the expression of
ideas and not ideas themselves .... The second axiom of copyright is that the first axiom is more of
an amorphous characterization than it is a principled guidepost.").
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would be the object of derision.' 18 It is not ideas that circulate in the
maelstrom of modem culture-at least, not ideas considered as pristine
propositional entities untainted by the form in which they were ex-
pressed. On the contrary, forms and expressions circulate-just listen,
for instance, to the similarities in the speech of any two teenagers chosen
at random-and they pervade each person's sense of what it is that he in
particular wants to say or produce.
The situation is most poignantly captured in a case concerning
George Harrison's song "My Sweet Lord," alleged to have been
plagiarized from the Chiffons' "He's So Fine." 119 Having discerned ex-
tensive musical similarities between the two compositions, the District
Judge made the following observations:
Seeking the well springs of musical composition-why a composer
chooses the succession of notes and the harmonies that he does-
whether it be George Harrison or Richard Wagner-is a fascinating
inquiry. It is apparent .. .that neither Harrison nor [collaborator
Billy] Preston were conscious of the fact that they were utilizing the
He's So Fine theme .... I conclude that the composer, in seeking
musical materials to clothe his thoughts, was working with various
possibilities. As he tried this possibility and that, there came to the
surface of his mind a particular combination that pleased him as being
one he felt would be appealing to a prospective listener; in other words,
that this combination of sounds would work. Why? Because his sub-
conscious knew it already had worked in a song his conscious mind did
not remember. 120
Despite the absence of intention or knowledge, Harrison was held to
have infringed the plaintiff's rights.
It is clear that cases like this make a difference to our image of the
copier. All of us-not just those in the entertainment industry-live in a
world alive with song; snatches and phrases of this and that tune wander
through our minds, more or less continually. One who fails to trace the
particular provenance of a combination of notes that happens to "work"
for him can hardly be regarded as thief. He is more like someone who
has stumbled onto another's property where there is no clear boundary
fence. More important, avoiding the sort of subconscious influence that
the judge traced in the Harrisongs case would require the most rigorous
and stultifying self-scrutiny. In this sense, the intellectual property rights
of the Chiffons impose a duty of respect on other musicians-a duty to
118. For an example of such derision, see GAINES, supra note I10, at 103.
119. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 178 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd, ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
120. Id. at 180 (footnotes omitted).
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ensure that one is avoiding subconscious imitation in a world resonating
with "original" tunes-that is in fact very burdensome.
There is one last twist to be noted. In her book Contested Cultures,
Jane Gaines has drawn attention to the fact that those who own and
propagate stories, songs, images and ideas lay a sort of trap for the people
whose lives are touched by their productions. 21
Consider the case we began with: the caricature of Disney Charac-
ters in the "Air Pirates" comic books.1 22 If one were to pursue an anal-
ogy with real property, one might get the idea from the decision that
Mickey Mouse was supposed to be the private domain of his creator,
analogous to Walt Disney's home or a piece of land that he owned, and
that all he was asking was that the courts should compel others to respect
the "Keep Out" signs that defined the boundaries of his property. But of
course any such analogy would be ludicrous. The whole point of the
Mickey Mouse image is that it is thrust out into the cultural world to
impinge on the consciousness of all of us. Its enormous popularity, con-
sciously cultivated for decades by the Disney empire, means it has be-
come an instantly recognizable icon, in a real sense part of our lives.
When Ralph Steadman paints the familiar mouse ears on a cartoon im-
age of Ronald Reagan, or when someone on my faculty refers to some
proposed syllabus as a "Mickey Mouse" idea,123 they attest to the fact
that this is not just property without boundaries on which we might acci-
dentally encroach (like George Harrison on "He's So Fine") but an arti-
fact that has been deliberately set up as a more or less permanent feature
of the environment all of us inhabit.
We see this happening in the attempt of every advertiser to make the
brand name of his product "a household word," to so inscribe his intel-
lectual property in the mind of every consumer as to make it a part of
their everyday vocabulary. And the fact is that some of them, like "aspi-
rin," "brassiere," "zipper," and "cellophane" do become household
words-so much so that it becomes ludicrous to continue insisting on the
original proprietor's right to control their use.124 Analytically, the pro-
cess is akin to a loss of property by prescription: improper use of a brand
121. GAINES, supra note 110, at 208-27.
122. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). This is not a case that
Gaines herself discusses, but I am adapting her analysis to apply to it.
123. "Mickey Mouse \'mik-e-'maus\ adj. [Mickey Mouse, cartoon character created by Walt
Disney] (1938) 1 often not cap : being or performing insipid or corny popular music 2 : lacking
importance : INSIGNIFICANT <Mickey Mouse courses, where you don't work too hard-Willie
Cager> 3 : annoyingly petty <Mickey Mouse regulations>." WEasrER's NINTH NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 749 (1990).
124. American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 208 F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1953) ("That
is a peril to which all such advertising is subject; its very success may prove its failure.").
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name to refer to an array of goods, not just those marketed by the origi-
nal inventor of the word, will in time result in the word becoming a ge-
neric term, so that its "proprietor" can no longer insist that his rights are
necessary to prevent confusion between his product and somebody else's.
But short of a legal determination that that has happened, 125 there are
still an enormous number of images, icons and phrases that exist in a sort
of grey area, still subject to intellectual property constraints, yet increas-
ingly part of the ordinary furniture of our world.
To illustrate: since 1896 in the modern era and, before that, from
classical antiquity, the idea of an olympic games-a great sports festival
bridging traditional barriers of national or political antipathy-has been
part of the culture of our civilization. Yet in recent years, the word
"Olympic" has been held to be private property. The rights in this case
were conferred specifically by statute: the Amateur Sports Act of 1978
authorized the private corporation that organized the Los Angeles games
(the USOC) to prohibit any person from using the word "Olympic" for
purpose of promoting, inter alia, "any theatrical exhibition, athletic per-
formance, or competition." The U.S. Supreme Court held that it was not
an unconstitutional restraint on free expression for the USOC to use this
provision to restrain a San Francisco-based organization from promoting
"the Gay Olympic Games."1 26 The court observed that the San Fran-
cisco group could have conveyed their meaning in other words, without
necessarily using what they held had become by statute a proprietary
term. By this means, then one word with all its cultural resonance was
simply removed from the arena of free expression-certainly dissident
expression-under cover of intellectual property rights.
It is difficult to disagree with Jane Gaines's verdict on this case:
I would read this case as a dispute over the representation of sexuality
in the symbolic terrain of the sports world. The attempt to 'occupy'
the trademark OLYMPIC was a strategic political maneuver on the
part of gay men and lesbians .... Justice Brennan, the single dissent-
ing voice on the court, seemed to recognize [this], for in his opinion he
argued that the image of the Olympics would help to mainstream
homosexuals. But the USOC borrowed intellectual property doctrine
in its attempt to settle the meaning of "Olympic" as a sign coterminous
with a "healthy" heterosexual image of male and female sport. The
USOC wanted, in short, to prohibit the connotative buildup that might
be produced through the association of this sign with
homosexuality. 127
125. See HALPERN ET AL., supra note 19, at 25 (intellectual property nerds call it "genericide").
126. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1987).
127. GAINES, supra note 110, at 238.
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The point, she insists, is that the association forged by the San Francisco
group's use of the term would work both ways. It might affect the tradi-
tional sporting symbol (an effect dealt with under trademark law's doc-
trine of "dilution") by associating gays with "Olympics." But it might
also affect the popular perception of homosexual men and women by as-
sociating "Olympics" with gays. Any attempt to prevent the one impact
has the effect also of preventing the other. Yet at most it is only the
former-the dilution of the trademark-that is considered and justified
by the jurisprudence of intellectual property. For the rest it is simply a
matter of hegemony--corporate control of the socially charged use of
one of the items in our vocabulary.
All of this raises profoundly important issues that can only be
touched on here. They have to do with the fact that we live not only in a
material environment where every space may be appropriated as private
property,128 but also in a cultural environment whose elements too are in
danger of being appropriated-"gobbled up" by the corporations of the
entertainment industry, like "a game of conceptual Pac Man," in David
Lange's apt image. 129 The private appropriation of the public realm of
cultural artifacts restricts and controls the moves that can be made
therein by the rest of us. Of course these artifacts have their originators,
and one can empathize with their initial impulse to control their own
work. Nevertheless what they (and their collaborators in marketing)
have done-and done intentionally-is make these artifacts now part of
our world. My point, then, is that this environment, having been thrust
upon us by those in whose interests cultural commodities circulate, is
now the only one we have, so that it is now in a sense unfair to deny us
the liberty to make of it what we will.
Indeed, the argument goes beyond that. For there is also the point
that we need some such cultural frame of reference and we must use the
only one we have, in our thoughts and our interactions with one an-
other.130 Lacking direct, telepathic contact, we must address one an-
other using, not only the resources of a common language and
vocabulary, but, in a larger sense, whatever images and catch-phrases
there are in the world, to provide points of mutual understanding and
128. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REv. 295, 300-
02 (1991).
129. David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 156
(1981). Lange's image no doubt violates the rights of the inventor of Pac Man. See also GAINES,
supra note 110, at 224-25.
130. For the human need for a "world" of common reference points for speech and action, see
generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE HuMAN CONDITION (1958).
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orientation, and to give as much color and richness as possible to our
cultural moves and counter-moves.
In the Air Pirates decision, the Ninth Circuit observed in a footnote
that the target of the parody was "life and society" not the Walt Disney
characters as such.1 3' The defendants, therefore, could hardly claim that
the detailed copying of the personalities of Mickey and Minnie Mouse-
"their wholesomeness and their innocence"I 32-was indispensable for
the point they wanted to make. The court went on to suggest that "[t]o
the extent that the Disney characters are not also an object of the parody
... the need to conjure them up would be reduced if not eliminated."'133
To this, one is tempted to respond in Lear-like exasperation, "0,
reason not the need! Our basest beggars / Are in the poorest thing super-
fluous. / Allow not nature more than nature needs, / Man's life is cheap
as beast's."' 34 That anyone could think that the progress of sciences and
useful arts is served by the Ninth Circuit's careful measuring of exactly
how much of an original work needs to be referred to in order to conjure
up the object of a parody is quite beyond me. One has only to look at a
single frame of the cartoon to see that the matter defies quantification,
and that no purpose except the blunting and bleaching of dissent is
served by such fastidious respect for "property." No doubt, Air Pirates
could have manufactured a series of telling, if tedious observations on
"life and society" without using or conjuring up any of the particular
icons or images of contemporary culture. They could even have created
new, and hence unfamiliar comic characters of their own. In this sense, I
suppose, their poaching Walt Disney's efforts was strictly "unnecessary."
But what a flat and colorless world it would be, if social discussion were
conducted according to these standards. Our arguments-the back and
forth of social and political critique-would have all the iclat and rich-
ness of the ponderous and respectful speeches of a Rotary Club. 35
XI. CONCLUSION
There is of course much more to be said on all these points. I know
I have not resolved very many of the perplexing issues raised in this Es-
131. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 n.15 (9th Cir. 1978).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act II, sc. 4. See also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE
NEEDS OF STRANGERS 29-53 (1984), discussing this passage and arguing that humans require the
cultural richness of particular relations to flesh out the bare bones of natural need.
135. This is analogous to a point I have made elsewhere about respect for others' religious views.
See Jeremy Waldron, Rushdie and Religion, in JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED
PAPERS 1981-91, at 139 (1993).
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say. What I have tried to do is to pick at one thread trailing from a
knotted tangle of intellectual property jurisprudence and see how much
unravels. The thread is, I believe, a neglected one: our conception of the
position or predicament of the frustrated copier as intellectual, as op-
posed to the position or predicament of the anxious publisher, eager for
his royalties. As with all property, our tendency is to approach matters
sympathetically from the perspective of the putative owner, rather than
oppositionally from the perspective of those who feel the impact of his
rights.
This, then, has been an Essay in oppositional analysis. Who are the
other parties in the copyright equation-the ones whom intellectual
property rights constrain-and how are we to think of them? Are they
individuals, to be considered one by one, or are they to be considered en
masse under the heading of "the public" or "the general interest in the
dissemination of knowledge." If they are thought of as individuals, are
they conceived passively or actively? Are they scholars or parodists?
Are they creative geniuses, or are they as pastiche-like as the works they
create? Are they working in an environment of their own choosing or in
one already constituted by the intellectual artifacts of others?
None of these questions is easy to answer. A change of perspective,
though salutary, is often a matter of wading confidently from one morass
to another. Nevertheless these are the ones we should be addressing, if
we are serious about the justification of intellectual property. There is a
lot of talk in this literature about where the burden of proof lies, and I
suppose that's a natural response to the deadlocks we have been discuss-
ing. 136 The fact is, however, that whether or not we speak of a burden of
proof, an institution like intellectual property is not self-justifying; we
owe a justification to anyone who finds that he can move less freely than
he would in the absence of the institution. So although the people whose
perspective I have taken-the copiers-may be denigrated as unoriginal
plagiarists or thieves of others' work, still they are the ones who feel the
immediate impact of our intellectual property laws. It affects what they
may do, how they may speak, and how they may earn a living. Of course
nothing is settled by saying that it is their interests that are particularly
at stake; if the tables were turned, we should want to highlight the per-
spective of the authors. But as things stand, the would-be copiers are the
ones to whom a justification of intellectual property is owed.
136. See, eg., Gordon, An Inquiry, supra note 27, at 1433 ("[A] procopyright advocate might try
to put the burden of persuasion on those who would give private persons liberties to affect others'
interests.").
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